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ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE
ASSESSMENT OF CLAIMANTS WHO ALLEGE
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
Robert H. Aronson,* Lonnie Rosenwald," & Gerald M. Rosen***
Abstract- Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was first recognized by the American
Psychiatric Association in 1980. A PTSD diagnosis requires an individual or individual's
loved ones to have experienced a traumatic event that was a threat to life or physical
integrity and caused the individual to react to the incident with a specific number of
avoidance, reexperiencing, and hyper-arousal symptoms. Obtaining a PTSD diagnosis can
be of great value to a personal-injury plaintiff who claims damages due to a traumatic event.
Further, if the traumatic event is unquestioned and the individual reports the classic
symptoms, a PTSD diagnosis is relatively easy to apply and difficult to disprove. These
plaintiffs will most often be examined and evaluated by mental-health professionals retained
by the defendants. The question of whether the claimant was told or provided materials
about common PTSD symptoms is crucial to the defense evaluator's accurate PTSD
assessment. One source of such information would be plaintiffs counsel, but questions
concerning information provided by counsel implicate the attorney-client privilege. This
Article suggests that the policy bases underlying the attorney-client privilege and protecting
a defendant's right to test the validity of a plaintiff's claims are best served by the creation of
a narrowly drawn waiver or exception to the attorney-client privilege. Consistent with the
patient-litigant exception to the physician-patient privilege, the proposed exception would
be limited to those matters directly related to the nature, diagnosis, and symptoms of PTSD
placed in issue by the plaintiff. The exception would also be limited to statements and
materials about PTSD symptoms the attorney provided the client. This Article also notes the
difficult ethical boundary between an attorney providing essential advice to a client about
the nature of emotional and psychological damages versus improper coaching. The proposed
exception would help discourage improper coaching and lead to the discovery of any
improper coaching that had already occurred. Even where the information provided by the
attorney was appropriate from an ethical standpoint, discovery of that information is
essential to an accurate diagnosis and fairness to defendants.
Recent highly publicized trials and events have once again raised
questions in the legal community and general public about attorney
conduct and ethics. One area of concern is the extent to which attorneys
have overstepped acceptable bounds by (over)zealously representing
their clients. The legal system has seen abuses by prosecutors and
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lawyers for both plaintiffs and defendants. Because unethical conduct on
the part of attorneys most often occurs at the instance or with the
consent of the client, it follows that unethical discussions between
attorney and client do occur but are at least ostensibly protected by
privilege. In such instances, should the opposing party be able to
discover, or even introduce at trial, information provided by the attorney
to the client? Commentators have suggested a number of situations in
which they believe that an exception to attorney-client confidentiality
should exist.
This Article addresses a relatively recent phenomenon: plaintiffs
claiming damages based on allegations of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD). Part I indicates the difficulty of accurately diagnosing PTSD,
the potential for abuse by claimants in forensic settings, and the
psychiatric evaluator's need to know whether the claimant's attorney
provided information about PTSD symptoms prior to the evaluation.
Part II reviews the historical rationales for the attorney-client privilege,
along with the established exceptions and waivers, and concludes that
despite the unquestioned value of attorney-client confidentiality, either
existing exceptions or a new exception based on overriding policy
concerns should be employed to permit the discovery, and possibly the
admission, of certain information. Part III establishes the bases and
parameters for a narrowly drawn exception for information provided to a
PTSD claimant by the claimant's attorney, when such information is
necessary for an accurate psychiatric evaluation. Finally, this Article
expresses concern that some lawyers may be playing an unethical role
by coaching their clients regarding how to present PTSD symptoms to
the forensic evaluator.
I. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Lavs and Attornet'-Client Confidences:
The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 273 (1992) (advocating child-
abuse reporting as exception to attorney-client privilege); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentialio,, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 400 (1989) (suggesting exception to attorney-client
confidentiality for harm to third parties); see also Robert Aronson, What About the Children? Are
Family Lawyers the Same (Ethically) As Criminal Lawyers, I J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 141
(1996).
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I. POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: THE DIFFICULTY
OF ACCURATE DIAGNOSIS AND THE NEED TO CONSIDER
INFORMATION PROVIDED TO CLAIMANTS
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was recognized in 1980 by the
American Psychiatric Association in the Third Edition of its Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual.2 The diagnosis has undergone revision since that
time3 but continues to maintain a basic assumption regarding causation
whereby a defined class of traumatic events is linked to a defined class
of symptoms.4 Thus, to obtain a PTSD diagnosis, an individual or
individual's loved ones must experience a traumatic event that was a
threat to life or physical integrity (the Stressor Criterion), and the
individual must react to the incident with a specific number of
avoidance, reexperiencing, and hyper-arousal symptoms (the Symptom
Criteria).' This causal link between the traumatic event and a set of
symptoms makes the a PTSD diagnosis particularly attractive in the
furtherance of a personal-injury claim. Unlike other psychiatric
diagnoses such as depression, where causes may be multiple or even
biologically determined with no external precipitant, the cause of PTSD
is clarified by the very act of making the diagnosis.6
Soon after the establishment of the PTSD diagnosis, commentators
expressed concerns about the potential for abuse in forensic and
2. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-IIl].
3. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 463 (4th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 424-29 (4th ed.
1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 247 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-IIIR].
4. The DSM-IV-TR provides that "[t]he essential feature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the
development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor."
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 463.
5. Id. at 463-68.
6. Id. Ralph Slovenko has observed that:
In tort litigation, PTSD is a favored diagnosis in cases of emotional distress because it is
incident specific. It tends to rule out other factors important to the determination of causation.
Thus plaintiffs can argue that all of their psychological problems issue from the alleged
traumatic event and not from myriad other sources encountered in life. A diagnosis of
depression, in contrast, opens the issue of causation to many factors other than the stated cause
of action."
Ralph Slovenko, Legal Aspects of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 17 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N.
AM. 439,441 fDavid A. Tomb ed., 1994).
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disability settings.7 These concerns can be raised at several levels. First,
there is the issue of whether a traumatic event actually occurred and if
the claimant was indeed present. In support of these concerns the
professional literature provides case reports on war-related PTSD claims
by individuals who never saw combat,8 and sting operations have
videotaped citizens scrambling onto a bus after a staged accident so they
could present themselves as injured passengers.9
Even if an event has occurred and the individual was present, there is
the issue of how that individual was affected. This is a difficult issue to
determine because the symptom criteria for diagnosing PTSD are
generally subjective, easily coached, and easily simulated."° Thus, an
individual who has experienced a traumatic event needs only to report
problems such as bad dreams, trouble sleeping, efforts to avoid thinking
about the event, loss of interest in hobbies, and perhaps two or three
other subjective complaints to fulfill criteria for the diagnosis."
7. Eldridge stated: "It is not surprising that there are reported cases of factitious
PTSD .... Exaggeration or fabrication of PTSD symptoms is possible and information about
diagnostic features of PTSD is common in the media." Gloria D. Eldridge, Contextual Issues in the
Assessment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 4 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 7, 11 (1991). Sparr and
Atkinson similarly noted: "Experience with forensic and disability cases where there is a high
possibility of secondary gain reveals that posttraumatic stress disorder is a difficult diagnosis to
establish ...." Landy F. Sparr & Roland M. Atkinson, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder As an
Insanity Defense: Medicolegal Quicksand, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 608, 613 (1986). They also
note that "the symptoms of [PTSD] are mostly subjective and non-specific, have been well
publicized, and are relatively easy to imitate." Id. at 608. Paul Lees-Haley considered the potential
for professionals to misuse a PTSD diagnosis and concluded: "If mental illnesses were rated on the
New York Stock Exchange, [PTSD] would be a growth stock to watch." Paul R. Lees-Haley,
Pseudo Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, TRIAL DIPLOMACY .. , Winter 1986, at 17-20.
8. Edward J. Lynn & Mark Belza, Factitious Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: The Veteran Who
Never Got to Vietnam, 35 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 697, 697-701 (1984); see also Landy
Sparr & Loren D. Pankratz, Factitious Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1016, 1016-19(1983).
9. Peter Kerr, 'Ghost Riders' Are Target of an Insurance Sting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at
Al.
10. Eldridge, supra note 7, at 7-23; Sparr & Atkinson, supra note 7, at 608-13.
11. The DSM-IV-TR requires that an individual who meets the diagnostic criteria for PTSD
must report one or more "reexperiencing symptoms," one of which includes "recurrent distressing
dreams of the event." DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 468. The individual must meet three or more
symptoms associated with "persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing
of general responsiveness," among which are included efforts to avoid thoughts associated with the
trauma, diminished interest in activities, and reduced expectations of having a normal future or life
span. Last, the individual must experience two or more symptoms that demonstrate "increased
arousal," such as difficulty sleeping and difficulty concentrating. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at
468.
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The mental-health professional who serves as forensic expert faces a
difficult task when assessing the validity of alleged problems resulting
from trauma. The expert cannot assume that an event has occurred as the
claimant describes or that the claimant even participated in the event as
alleged. The expert also cannot assume a claimant actually has a
posttraumatic stress disorder simply because the defining symptoms are
reported. These problems are recognized in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, which specifically
cautions professionals to rule out malingering when PTSD presents in
forensic and disability settings.'
Michael Trimble reflected on the attraction of a PTSD diagnosis in
forensic settings and the problem of malingering when he noted that
attorneys might coach clients in the furtherance of a claim: "[PTSD,]
sanctioned so neatly by the DSM-III, clearly has both conceptual and
medico-legal implications.... [It] will give a great deal of leverage to
those seeking compensation and the counting off of symptoms in
checklist fashion will become routine practice in many a lawyer's
office."
13
Recently, Trimble's concerns received support when twenty survivors
of a major marine disaster filed personal-injury claims for emotional
damages, resulting in a high incidence rate of diagnosed PTSD. 4 As it
12. The text of the DSM-IV states: "Malingering should be ruled out in those situations in which
financial remuneration, benefit eligibility, and forensic determinations play a role." DSM-IV, supra
note 3, at 467.
13. Michael R. Trimble, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder: History of a Concept, in TRAUMA AND
ITS WAKE 5-14 (Charles R. Figley ed., 1985).
14. Gerald M. Rosen, The Aleutian Enterprise Sinking and Postiraumatic Stress Disorder:
Misdiagnosis in Clinical and Forensic Settings, 26 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RESEARCH & PRACTICE 82,
82-87 (1995). Records, reports, and depositions of treating doctors showed that nineteen of twenty
litigating survivors had been seen by one or more mental-health professionals and all had presented
with the hallmark features of PTSD. All mental-health professionals provided a diagnosis of PTSD,
and these diagnoses were maintained for six months or longer. The survivors' presentation of
symptoms yielded a total incidence rate for diagnosed PTSD of eighty-six percent if it was
conservatively assumed that non-assessed survivors did not have problems. Rosen pointed out that
nowhere in the scientific literature has such a high incidence rate been reported for survivors of
accidental trauma. Instead, epidemiological surveys find that fewer than twenty-five percent of
accident survivors report reactions of sufficient severity to warrant a PTSD diagnosis. See, e.g.,
Naomi Breslau et al., Traumatic Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in an Urban Population
of Young Adults, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 216, 216-22 (1991); Fran H. Norris,
Epidemiolog, of Trauma: Frequency and Impact of Different Potentially Traumatic Events on
Different Demographic Groups, 60 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 409, 409-18 (1992).
Recent methodological refinements in surveying techniques suggest rates of PTSD after accidents
that are even lower. See, e.g., Naomi Breslau et al., Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in
the Community, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 620, 626-32 (1998).
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turned out, the high incidence of diagnosed PTSD among litigating
survivors was explained, at least in part, by reports of attorney coaching
and symptom sharing. Thus, several survivors discussed in follow-up
interviews how they had received instructions from their counsel.' 5
Three reported being told they did not need to work. 6 Another explained
that he was told it might be worth his while to see a doctor every week. '
7
Another survivor reported that attorneys had explained to several crew
members how people with PTSD had sleep problems, nightmares, and
fears. 8 Rosen noted in his report on the Aleutian Enterprise sinking:
"All told, 6 of 20 survivors provided unambiguous reports that some
form of attorney advice had occurred with regard to symptoms of PTSD,
not going back to work, or the merits of seeing a doctor."' 9 The
survivors reported that crew members shared this information with
others in the group.20
Findings from this maritime case do not represent an isolated
instance. J. R. Youngjohn has documented a case of attorney coaching
prior to the neuropsychological evaluation of a mild head-injury client.2 '
Further, in one survey of attorneys, sixty-three percent of those
questioned felt it was appropriate to provide clients with information
about psychological-test validity measures, when separate studies find
that such coaching can reduce the performance of validity checks.22 Paul
Lees-Haley has reviewed these findings and observed that "insofar as
examinees' responses to tests and interviews reflect preparation by an
attorney for litigation, instead of the psychological status of the
15. Rosen, supra note 14, at 82-87.
16. Id. at 84.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. James R. Youngjohn, Confirmed Attorney Coaching Prior to Neuropsychological
Evaluation, 2 ASSESSMENT 279, 280-83 (1995).
22. See Martha W. Wetter & Susan K. Corrigan, Providing Information to Clients About
Psychological Tests: A Survey ofAttorneys'and Law Students' Attitudes, 26 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES.
& PRACrICE 474, 474-77 (1995). The finding that forty-seven to forty-eight percent of those
surveyed "always or usually" provided clients with information about psychological-test validity
measures, and sixteen percent "sometimes" provided such information, raises concerns for
psychologists who also have found that coaching about validity scales can reduce the effectiveness
of these scales. See Ruth A. Baer et al., Effects of Information About Validity Scales on
Underreporting of Symptoms on the MMPI-2: An Analogue Investigation, 2 PSYCHOL.
ASSESSMENT 189, 189-200 (1995); see also Joanne Storm & John R. Graham, Detection of
Coached General Malingering on the MMPI-2, 12 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 158, 158-65 (2000).
Vol. 76:313, 2001
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examinee, the validity of psychologists' expert opinions may be
compromised."
In addition to professional peer-review articles that speak to the issue
of attorney coaching, insurance "sting operations" have demonstrated
that attorneys can play an active role in furthering the presentation of
false claims.24 In light of such findings, a responsible forensic evaluator
would want to know whether a claimant's attorney has provided
information about psychiatric symptoms that might pertain to the
claimant's clinical presentation. Unfortunately, efforts to obtain such
information inevitably run up against claims of attorney-client
confidentiality.
23. Paul R. Lees-Haley, Attorneys Influence Expert Evidence in Forensic Psychological and
Neuropsychological Cases, 4 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 321,321-24 (1997).
24. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 9, at Al. New Jersey transit companies reported that when buses
had collisions in urban areas,
they would often be surrounded by 'runners' for doctors and lawyers who would get on the
bus, hand out leaflets with phone numbers, and encourage passengers to say they suffered from
back or neck injuries that are hard to disprove. The most sophisticated runners spent their days
scanning police radio frequencies for word of traffic accidents.... One tape made inside a bus
crashed in September 1992, shows a man jumping onto the bus three minutes after the accident
and declaring to the passengers on board: "All you people who want to get paid you stay right
there, stay down. Wait for the ambulance to come. Your neck hurts, your legs hurt. All of that.
You'll get some money. Stay there. They pay."
Id. at D2.
Sting operations have contributed to public awareness that coaching occurs, to the extent that the
phenomenon has now appeared in popular books of fiction, much to the detriment of attorneys'
professional image. See G. M. Rosen, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Pulp Fiction, and the Press,
24 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW, 267, 267-69 (1996), who cites Carl Hiassen's Strip
Tease (1993). In that pulp fiction book one of the leading characters places a cockroach in a
container of yogurt and reseals the package, preparing to make a claim for PTSD. The character
meets with his attorney and states:
"Tell me about your ace shrink," to which counsel responds, "A good man. I've used him on
other cases. You should start seeing him as soon as possible, and as often as possible.... It's
important to document your pain and suffering. It will help determine the final
damages.... You might even consider quitting your job.... Lost income would greatly
enhance ajury award.
Hiassen, supra, at 52.
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II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY: APPLICABILITY
TO A PTSD CLAIM
A. Historical Perspective: Confidentiality To Promote Free Flow of
Communication
Professor Wigmore stated the classic conception of the attorney-client
privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the
protection be waived.
The privilege is rooted in sixteenth-century common law.26 At that
time, although parties were not allowed to testify at trial, their attorneys
could be called to testify.27 Steeped in notions of the attorney as a
gentleman, whose "first duty... is to keep the secrets of his client,"'28
the privilege originally protected the attorney from the unwonted
compromise of his "honor" that compulsory testimony regarding client
confidences would entail.29 At its inception, the privilege belonged to the
attorney, who could waive it.3"
By the eighteenth century, ownership of the privilege shifted to the
client, as did the ability to waive it. 3I The privilege came to be seen as a
25. JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
26. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 198-203 (1926); JOHN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d ed. 1940). It has been suggested that the privilege reflects "ideas
at least as old as Roman Law." CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.2, at 242
(1986) (citing Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16
CAL. L. REV. 487 (1928)).
27. WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 6.1.2, at 243.
28. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2290, at 543 (quoting Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng. Rep. 401,
406 (C.P. 1836)).
29. Id. at 530-31; WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 6.1.2, at 243.
30. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2290, at 544-45; see also ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T.
WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A NUTSHELL 196 (2d ed. 1991); WOLFRAM, supra
note 26, § 6.1.2, at 243.
31. See In re Colton, 201 F. Supp 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), qf/jd, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962);
see also Wolfram, supra note 26, § 6.1.2, at 243 (citing Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St.
Tr. 1139, 1225 (Ex. 1743) (opinion of Mountenay, B.)).
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means of safeguarding the client's freedom in consulting and benefiting
from the assistance of counsel.32 The existence of the privilege was
thought to encourage greater candor on the part of the client and to
enhance the truth-seeking functions of the adversary system.33 The
privilege protected both the client's statements to the attorney and the
attorney's statements to the client.34 This was deemed by some to be
essential because any statements by the attorney could reveal the nature
of the client's disclosures and could also be interpreted as admissions by
the client.35
B. Definition of the Privilege and Rationalefor Its Continued Use
1. Privilege: The Evidentiary Obligation To Protect Client
Communications from Disclosure
Today, the common law privilege has been statutorily codified in
most states36 and a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions have
interpreted and upheld the privilege, finding that
its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.
The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
32. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391,403 (1976).
33. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403; see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 51 (1980) (noting that privilege assures that "advocate and counselor [can] know all that relates
to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out").
34. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981). But see Wells v.
Rushing, 755 F.2d 376, 379 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that content of communication may not be
privileged to the extent that it contained communications from attorney to client). Some courts
have noted that advice given by a lawyer to his client is privileged only if the advice is based on, or
would reveal, confidential information furnished by the client. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S.
Dept. of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242,254 (D.C. Cir. 1977); SMC Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508
(D. Conn. 1976); J.P. Foley & Co., Inc. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523,526 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
35. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 358; see also ARONSON & WECKSTEIN, supra note 30, at 196. But
see, e.g., SCM Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 522.
36. For example, in Washington, the privilege is codified at REViSED CODE OF WASHINGTON
5.60.060(2) (2000): "An attorney or counselor shall not, without the consent of his or her client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him or her, or his or her advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment." See also, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (2000);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (McKinney 2000).
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serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.37
In spite of the privilege's general acceptance, it has not been without
its critics. Early commentators noted that if lawyers warned clients from
the start not to discuss criminal or other improper conduct, the end result
would be positive-that is, the truly guilty would receive less legal
assistance. Others believed the argument that clients would not confide
in lawyers absent a broad privilege was not compelling because surveys
have shown much of the public does not believe an absolute privilege
exists.39 Lawyers themselves are not completely comfortable with a rule
that arguably has evolved as a tool to protect information unnecessarily
when disclosure would be desirable.4" Professor Wigmore cautioned
against an overly broad application of the privilege and urged that it be
employed as "an exception to the general duty to disclose" that should
be "strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits. ' 4 I
2. Privilege: The Ethical Obligation To Protect Client
Communications from Disclosure
In addition to the evidentiary attorney-client privilege, there is also a
general ethical duty of attorney-client confidentiality springing from the
law of agency.42 While there is considerable overlap between the
37. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51; see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403-04.
Some authorities have suggested that the privilege helps to prevent crime and other misconduct by
encouraging clients to disclose contemplated wrongdoing, giving attorneys a chance to discourage
such acts. See. e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392. But cf Zacharias, supra note I, at 369-70 (indicating
that there is no empirical evidence to support this argument).
38. WIGMORE, supra note 25, at 549 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 302-04 (1827)).
39. For example, a 1962 Yale Law School study found that 40 of 108 laypeople questioned
believed that attorneys could be compelled to disclose all confidences in court. Zacharias, supra
note 1, at 394.
40. In a survey of lawyers in upstate New York, more than one-third said they had asserted the
privilege when they believed they should have been required to disclose information. Zacharias,
supra note 1, at 382.
41. WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2292, at 554.
42. The ethical rule is codified in the ABA's MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(MRPC), Rule 1.6 (2000), which provides in part: "(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, [with limited
exceptions]."
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Confidentiality and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
privilege and the ethical duty, there are notable differences between the
two. As an evidentiary rule, the attorney-client privilege applies in
judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a
witness or otherwise compelled to produce evidence about a client. It
also is limited to those matters communicated in confidence to an
attorney by his or her client or by the attorney or client to an
intermediary necessary for effective communication between the
attorney and client.43
The lawyer's ethical duty to maintain client confidentiality is much
broader, encompassing the full range of obligations owed by an agent to
a principal. Not limited to situations in which evidence is sought from
the lawyer under the compulsion of law, the ethics rule forbids
unauthorized disclosure of client confidences in any forum and
regardless of the source of the information.' Within its scope, therefore,
is all "information relating to the representation," not just confidences
shared by the client. 5 Under the more capacious ethical obligation, the
lawyer as a trusted "agent" truly is the keeper of the client's secrets.
C. Exceptions to the Privilege: Crime or Fraud
Although quite expansive, attorney-client confidentiality as embodied
in both the evidentiary privilege and the ethical rules of professional
conduct is subject to certain limited exceptions. Most notably, the
attorney-client privilege does not attach to advice sought by the client in
furtherance of a crime or fraud.' The rationale for this exception is that
A majority ofjurisdictions has adopted this rule, with some modifications. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S
MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT § 55:104-107 (1993); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101; ARONSON & WECKSTEIN, supra note 30, at 197; Zacharias, supra note
1, at 361-62.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Consol. Litig.
Concerning Int'l Harvester's Disposition of Wis. Steel, 666 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(collecting cases).
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5 (2000); see also ARONSON & WECKSTEIN,
supra note 30, at 198-200; ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 55:902.
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
46. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15
(1933) (stating that attorney and client communications are no longer privileged where client seeks
to commit fraud); see also Burton v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 167 F.R.D. 134, 142-43 (D. Kan.
1996) (noting that evidence sufficient to establish prima facie showing that tobacco company
attorneys were used to facilitate perpetration of continuing fraud to deceive American public about
hazards of smoking was sufficient for crime or fraud exception to attorey-client privilege); Haines
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 697 (D.NJ. 1992), order vacated on other grounds, 975
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a lawyer advising a client in the commission of a crime or fraud is not
acting within his or her rightful capacity as a legal advisor, and the client
is not entitled to invoke the privilege in such an instance.47 Similarly, if
the communications regarding the commission of a crime or fraud are
initiated by the lawyer but the client acts in accordance with the
fraudulent advice, the privilege would be vitiated because the privileged
relationship would not exist. 8 The proponent of the crime or fraud
exception must make a foundational showing of crime or fraud to obtain
the otherwise privileged communications. 49 The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that before a trial court can even engage in an in camera review of
the privileged materials, the proponent of the exception must make a
showing adequate to support "a good faith belief by a reasonable
person" that review of the materials will produce evidence sufficient to
warrant application of the exception. °
Under the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules, a lawyer
may not knowingly counsel or assist a client in conduct that is criminal
or fraudulent,5 nor may the lawyer use false evidence or commit a fraud
upon the court. 2 Also, a lawyer who learns a client intends to commit a
criminal act that is likely to result in "imminent death" or "substantial
bodily harm" has the discretion to reveal the information in order to
F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that intentional shielding of evidence that scientific research might
tend to prove smoking caused disease was viable theory of fraud entitling plaintiffs to discovery of
withheld documents under crime or fraud exception to attorney-client privilege); Buell v. Superior
Court, 391 P.2d 919, 924 (Ariz. 1964) (noting that attomey-client communications are not
protected where client consults attomey for purposes of committing fraud); People v. Superior
Court (Bauman), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that attomey-client
privilege was not applicable where services of lawyer were sought to enable or aid in plan or
commission of crime or fraud); Whetstone v. Olson, 46 Wash. App. 308, 310, 732 P.2d 159, 161
(1986) (stating that exception applies if client knows, or reasonably should know, that advice is
sought for wrongful purpose).
47. See GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §1.6.109
(Supp. 1996); Zolin, 491 U.S. at 571; Whetstone, 46 Wash. App. at 309, 732 P.2d at 160-61; see
also WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 6.4.10, at 279-82; David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth:
The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege.for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds 64 N.C. L.
REV. 443,458 (1986).
48. Clark, 289 U.S. at 15.
49. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
50. Id. at 57 1.
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4). But see id. at R. 1.2(d): "[A] lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application
of the law."
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prevent commission of the crime. 3 A lawyer may also reveal client
confidences to the extent necessary to protect the lawyer from any
liability that may emerge from the representation of the client.54 Some
states have added exceptions for fraud,55 information involving possible
bodily harm,56 and past client improprieties involving the lawyer's
services.57
D. Waiver of the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege may also be waived by the client. This
waiver may occur either expressly or implicitly. An express waiver may
be effected either in discovery or at trial when a client clearly and
voluntarily agrees to waive the privilege.5 ' Also, in some instances, an
"implied" waiver of the privilege is found to occur.5 9 When, for
53. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1). In some states, this portion of the rule has been modified and expanded to
allow a lawyer (in his or her discretion) to reveal client confidences to prevent the client from
committing any crime. There is no requirement that the crime be one that is likely to result in
"imminent death" or "bodily harm.' ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ 55:104-107 (1993). Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Texas, and Wisconsin all have versions of RPC 1.6 that make mandatory disclosure of information
reasonably necessary to prevent a client from committing a crime likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm. Id.; cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,
§ 1 17A (Proposed Final Draft No. 2 1998); ABA Ethics 2000 Commission's Proposed Revision of
RPC l.6(b)(l).
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2).
55. See, e.g., Sup. Ct. Va. R. 1.6(b)(3) (2000).
56. See, e.g., RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-1.6(b)(2) (2000).
57. See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(2) (2000); MD. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2000); NEV. SUPREME COURT RULES R. 156(3)(a) (2000).
58. See, e.g., G.S. Enters., Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 571 N.E. 2d 1363, 1368-69 (Mass.
199 1) (finding defendant's express waiver of attorney-client privilege after formal discovery period
had elapsed was not too late to preclude reliance on defense).
59. See, e.g., Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that implied waiver where communication "goes to the heart of the claim"); Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. v. DiFede, 780 P.2d 533, 543 (Colo. 1989) (finding that implied waiver results
when party places in issue confidential communication going to heart of claim); League v. Vanice,
374 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Neb. 1985) (stating party impliedly waives privilege by raising issue central
to his ability to maintain action); Jakobleffv. Cerrato, Sweeney & Cohn, 97 A.D.2d 834, 835 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983) (noting that privilege is impliedly waived when necessary to determine validity of
claim and when application would deprive adversary of vital information); Kammerer v. W. Gear
Corp., 96 Wash. 2d 416, 420, 635 P.2d 708, 711 (1981) (noting that when client intends to waive
privilege, waiver cannot be delayed until trial because it would unduly limit discovery); see also
United States v. Sanders, 979 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that attorney-client-privilege
objection is waived where defendant fails to make timely and specific objection to admission of
privileged statement at trial); Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191, 196-97 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that
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example, the client discloses the communications to a third person,6°
chooses to testify regarding privileged communications, 61 or fails to
object when others reveal the privileged communications.62
The privilege is also waived when, as part of a claim or defense, the
client places the subject matter of the confidence in issue.63 Reasoning
that privileged materials ought not to be used as both a shield and a
sword, courts have employed a "fairness doctrine '  in finding a waiver
of the privilege for matters in issue.65
This waiver of the attorney-client privilege has been found where a
client brings a claim of legal malpractice 66 or asserts reliance on the
attorney-client privilege waived for failure to object to questioning that led client to testify
concerning portions of attorney-client communication); Love v. United States, 386 F.2d 260, 265
(8th Cir. 1967) (noting that failure of defendant to object to testimony of attorney who represented
him in another case waived assertion of attorney-client privilege on appeal).
60. See, e.g., In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that client's acqui-
escence in attorney's publication of widely read book containing privileged materials from client's
criminal case was sufficient to waive privilege for those matters in subsequent civil case); Denver
Post Corp. v. Univ. of Colo., 739 P.2d 874, 881 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that attorney-client
privilege was waived where university disclosed to state auditor information gathered from internal
investigation regarding contracts with Saudi Arabia); Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 145 (Del.
1982) (holding that revelation to close friend waived privilege); State v. Shire, 850 S.W.2d 923,
931 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding attorney-client privilege waived where defendant's daughter was
present during conversations between attorney and client and daughter's presence was not
necessary or essential to communication).
61. See State v. Ingels, 4 Wash. 2d 676, 104 P.2d 944 (1940); State v. Vandenberg, 19 Wash.
App. 182, 187, 575 P.2d 254, 257 (1978) (holding client's testimony as to fact of communication
to attorney waives privilege for whole of that communication and all other communications to
attorney on same subject matter).
62. E.g., Love, 386 F.2d at 265.
63. E.g., Harding v. Dana Transp., Inc. 914 F. Supp. 1084, 1096 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that
employer waived attorney-client privilege with respect to communications between manager and
attorney by using information gathered from that conversation as part of its defense); N.Y. TRW
Title Ins., Inc. v. Wade's Canadian Inn & Cocktail Lounge, Inc., 638 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996) (holding that attorney-client privilege was waived where defendants placed
question of parties' intent at issue); Seattle NW Sec. Corp. v. SDG Holding Co., 61 Wash. App.
725, 742-43, 812 P.2d 488, 498-99 (1991) (raising issue of existence of confidential
communication).
64. In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101.
65. See Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
privilege was waived when client asserted affirmative defense of reliance on advice of counsel);
Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Wade's Canadian Inn,
638 N.Y.S.2d at 801; Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 161-63 (Tex. 1993) (regarding
"offensive use" exception).
66. E.g., Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash. 2d 198, 208, 787 P.2d 30, 36 (1990); WIGMORE, supra
note 25, § 2327, at 638; see also Elia v. Pifer, 977 P.2d 796, 804 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that by
filing legal malpractice action against domestic-relations attorney, client impliedly waived
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advice of counsel as an affirmative defense.67 In Hearn v. Rhay,6" for
example, the court required disclosure of legal advice given to
defendants who asserted the defense of qualified immunity from a claim
for damages under the Civil Rights Act based on their status as "public
officials."'69 Because the defendants contended that they acted in good
faith and on the advice of legal counsel, the court found the content of
their communications with counsel was "inextricably merged" with the
affirmative defense and "inhere[d] in the controversy itself."'7 The court
stated the benefit to be gained from disclosure outweighed any potential
damage to the attorney-client relationship because access to the
materials was required for a "fair and just determination" of the issues.7'
The Hearn court applied a three-part test to determine whether the
privilege had been implicitly waived:
(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act,
such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this
affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at
-issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the
privilege would have denied the opposing party access to
information vital to his defense.72
A number of courts have followed Hearn.73
Other courts, however, have criticized Hearn for creating an overly
broad "placing-at-issue" exception and thereby undermining the
legislative intent of the privilege by requiring a balancing of the interests
attorney-client privilege as to communications with client's subsequent domestic-relations and
bankruptcy attorneys); Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 1057, 1060 (R.I.
1999) (holding that assignment of legal malpractice claim as part of commercial transaction serves
as waiver of client's attorney-client privilege).
67. Pennzoil, 974 F.2d at 1161.
68. 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
69. See id. at 578, 581.
70. Id. at 582.
71. Id.
72 Id. at 581.
73. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 398, 399-401 (1984) (noting
that some courts have "adopted the automatic waiver rule ... on the theory that when a party seeks
judicial relief, he waives whatever privilege he has"); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 1118, 1125 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); Frank W. Schaefer, Inc. v. C. Garfield
Mitchell Agency, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 442,447-48 (Ohio CL App. 1992); see also Zenith Radio Corp.
v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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of the privilege holder against those of the opponent.74 For example, the
Third Circuit criticized Hearn in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home
Indemnity Co.7 ' The court noted it is essential that clients know from the
start what confidences will never be revealed.76 By making later
disclosure dependent on the particular facts of future litigation, the Third
Circuit asserted that the Hearn court had destroyed that predictability."
The court instead adopted a narrower waiver rule: "The advice of
counsel is placed in issue where the client asserts a claim or defense, and
attempts to prove that claim or defense by disclosing or describing an
attorney client communication. '7 8
However, Hearn is not, or need not be, as open-ended as the Third
Circuit implied. First, the decision places a heavy burden on the party
seeking disclosure by requiring it to demonstrate the necessity of
disclosure.79 Courts can add further safeguards by requiring that a party
also show that it has exhausted every reasonable alternative source of
the information sought and that it describe the information with
reasonable specificity.8"
The "at issue" exception to attorney-client privilege corresponds to
the exceptions to the physician-patient and psychotherapist-client
privileges that apply in personal-injury and wrongful-death actions.
Several states have enacted exceptions to those privileges in situations
where the patient puts his or her physical, mental, or emotional state at
issue in litigation. For example, under Rule 510 of the Texas Rules of
Evidence, a plaintiff who seeks damages for alleged injuries, such as
mental anguish, may not suppress communication or records relevant to
his or her mental and emotional condition.8' Codified by statute in some
74. E.g., Succession of Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So. 2d 1138, 1145-46 (La.
1987).
75. 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1994).
76. See id. at 863-84.
77. Id. at 864.
78. Id. at 863.
79. Heam v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581-82 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
80. See, e.g., Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 838 F.2d 13,
18 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding, in case involving prosecution for criminal trespass, that only privileged
communications that were made while undercover informant was present were subject to
discovery).
81. TEXAS RULES ANN. R. 510(d)(5) (Vernon 2001); see also HAW. R. EVID. 504.1(d)(3) (1995)
(establishing psychologist-client privilege but stating: "There is no privilege under this rule as to a
communication relevant to the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the client in any
proceeding in which the client relies upon the condition as an element of the client's claim or
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states, there is an automatic waiver of the litigant's physician-patient
privilege after the commencement of the action.82 Likewise, the privilege
is waived in the criminal context when a psychiatrist, formerly a
member of the defense team, is called as a witness by the State, after the
defendant has raised the insanity defense.83 By placing his or her mental
state in issue, a defendant waives any privilege with respect to that issue.
Even when the attorney-client privilege is applicable, the privilege
may be waived. Such a waiver may be express or implied. A widely
recognized implied waiver of the physician-patient privilege occurs
when the patient places his or her physical or mental state in issue. A
similar waiver of the attorney-client privilege would be appropriate in
civil cases.
E. Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Cases
While the fundamentals of attorney-client confidentiality are the same
in criminal and civil suits, it is important to distinguish the underlying
rationales for confidentiality in these two very different realms. In the
criminal context, the defendant may bolster the underlying rationales of
the attorney-client privilege with constitutional protections against self-
defense."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.2363 (West 2000) (establishing psychologist-client privilege
except "[w]here the patient or client puts his mental state in issue by alleging mental or emotional
damages or condition in any judicial or administrative proceedings"); MD. CODE ANN. § 9-
109(d)(i) (2001) (establishing psychiatrist-client and psychologist-client privilege except when "the
patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense"); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 71-, 206.29 (Michie Supp. 2000) (noting that psychologist-client privilege exists except
"[w]hen the client or patient, by alleging mental or emotional damages in litigation, puts his or her
mental state in issue"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (Supp. 2000) (stating that communication
between psychiatrist and patient is privileged except in proceedings "in which the patient raises the
issue of the patient's mental or emotional condition;" if patient raises issue, communication shall
be disclosed only after finding by court that "the evidence cannot be obtained from another source"
or that "the evidence sought is necessary to avoid substantial injustice to the party seeking it, and
either that the disclosure will result in no significant harm to the patient or that it would be
substantially unfair as between the requesting party and the patient not to require the disclosure").
82. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4)(b) (2000) (stating that privilege is waived ninety
days after commencement of action); see also CAL. EVyD. CODE ANN. § 996 (West 2001)
(codifying exception to physician-patient privilege for personal-injury actions); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2157 (West 2000) (stating that patient waives physician-patient privilege by
bringing personal-injury action or malpractice suit), § 600.2912f (stating that person who has given
notice or commenced action alleging medical malpractice waives physician-patient privilege).
83. In re Rice, 118 Wash. 2d 876, 889-90, 828 P.2d 1086, 1094-95 (1992); see also State v.
Pawlyk, 115 Wash. 2d 457,465,800 P.2d 338, 342 (1990); State v. Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 21-22,
653 P.2d 1024, 1035-36 (1982).
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the attorney-client privilege with constitutional protections against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment,84 the right to the assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment," and the presumption of
innocence. Further, zealous advocacy by defense counsel is necessary to
offset the resources the police and prosecutors can marshal to prove the
defendant's guilt. Therefore, even when a criminal defendant admits
guilt to his or her attorney, the adversary system assumes that greater
justice for more people will be achieved if the attorney is not permitted
to reveal the information.86 This rationale supports the justice system's
fundamental assumption that it is preferable to let ten guilty people go
free than to have one innocent person convicted.87
In the civil realm, by contrast, these constitutional considerations do
not come into play. There is, for example, no presumption of innocence
and no privilege against self-incrimination. Consequently, the civil
litigant may be required to produce evidence about the facts underlying
an attorney-client communication, even if incriminating, where the
criminal defendant would be protected from doing so under the Fifth
Amendment. Likewise, different considerations apply when the privilege
is used to shield from scrutiny a plaintiff's claim for damages due to
emotional stress, particularly when the accurate PTSD diagnosis is so
dependent on whether the symptoms occurred after "prompting" by one
or more third persons.
In spite of these inherent distinctions, many of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, including the strict rule of confidentiality, are
premised on a criminal-law vision of lawyers' roles and obligations.
Noting that the Rules of Professional Conduct state rules applicable to
lawyers in all fields of practice, resulting in rules that in some cases are
irrelevant and in others are contrary to certain highly specialized
practice areas, some legal ethicists have proposed the adoption of more
84. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402-05 (1976).
85. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Sixth
Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications between the accused and his
attorney.").
86. See People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 802 (1975); MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 210 cmt. a
(1942).
87. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 368 n.158 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting
Justice William 0. Douglas in Foreword, J. FRANK& B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY, 11-12 (1957)). But
see 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 474-75 (J. Bowring ed. 1843) (suggesting that lawyer
whose representation enabled client whom he knew to be guilty to escape punishment was virtually
accessory after fact to crime).
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flexible rules of attorney-client confidentiality to account for these
differences. 8
In harmony with this approach, the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers' (AAML) Bounds ofAdvocacy elaborates on, and
occasionally modifies, the Rules of Professional Conduct in the family-
law area.89 Its standards specifically provide for an exception to the rule
of confidentiality, and hence, permit disclosure that an attorney
reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial physical or sexual
abuse of a child.9° Similarly, many states have carved out exceptions to
various evidentiary privileges and duties of confidentiality in their child
abuse reporting laws. Some states have compelled attorney reporting,9
while others have left it in the attorney's discretion.92 Most states'
statutes expressly state that reporting of child abuse will not constitute a
violation of the confidential communications privileges of most
professions but make no mention of the attorney-client privilege.93 As
the AAML's Bounds of Advocacy suggests, however, allowing a family
88. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083,
1090 (1988); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the
Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1993); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for
Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990); Zacharias, supra note 1, at 400; see also Aronson, supra
note 1, at 150-51.
89. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS' (AAML) BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY:
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (1991); AAML BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR FAMILY LAWYERS
(2000), available at http://www.aaml.org.
90. AAML BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (2000) Goal 6.5 ("An attorney should disclose information
relating to a client or former client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
prevent substantial physical or sexual abuse of a child."); AAML BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (1991)
Standard 2.26 ("An attorney should disclose evidence of a substantial risk of physical or sexual
abuse of a child by the attorney's client."). A footnote recognizes, however, that such disclosure
would be prohibited in some jurisdictions as "conduct adverse to the client and based on
confidential information.' BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (2000) n.79; BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY (1991)
n.42.
91. See, e.g., NJ. Sup. CL Advisory Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 280 Supp. (1974) (finding that
attorney-client privilege does not apply and information must be reported to Children's Bureau);
Wis. Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. E-88-1 I (deciding that lawyer must report).
92. See, e.g., Indianapolis Bar Assn. Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1-1986 (April 29, 1986) (attorney
permitted to report); see also generally Mosteller, supra note 1, at 216-17.
93. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.060(3) (2000) ("[C]onduct conforming with the
reporting requirements of this chapter shall not be deemed a violation of the confidential
communication privilege of RCW 5.60.060 (3) [priest/clergyman] and (4) [physician], 18.53.200
[optometrist] and 18.83.100 [psychologist]"); see also Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell?
Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion,
71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 734 n.53 (1987) ("[T]he express retention of the attorney-client privilege
[in most statutes] is noteworthy in light of the frequently conceded weakness of its rationale.").
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lawyer the discretion to reveal confidences in order to protect the best
interests of a child would truly serve the interests both of the family law
system and the public in keeping children from harm.94 Even if it were
necessary to safeguard the abuser's criminal system protections by
prohibiting use of such confidential information in any criminal
proceeding, at least the child would be better protected and any custody
determination would be made on the basis of all relevant facts.
Constitutional support for the attorney-client privilege of criminal
defendants is not applicable to civil penalties. In the criminal context, a
broad privilege with narrow exception preserves the defendant's
presumption of innocence and Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The
principles do not support preventing discovery of information about
PTSD provided to a civil litigant claiming damages based on PTSD.
F. Bases for Finding PTSD Claims
A waiver or exception to the attorney-client privilege for information
about PTSD symptomology provided to a plaintiff claiming damages
due to PTSD could be justified on a number of bases. First, since the
attorney-client privilege shields relevant information from the trier of
fact, it should be narrowly construed consistent with its purpose:
encouraging clients to confide fully in their attorneys. As such, it would
not include materials and information about PTSD diagnosis and
94. AAML BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY, Goal 6.5 cmt. As stated in the Comment to the ABA Ethics
2000 Commission's Proposed Revision of RPC 1.6(b)(l):
Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve
the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the
confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. In becoming privy to information about a
client, a lawyer may foresee that the client intends serious harm to another person. However, to
the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the client will be
inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful
course of action. The public is better protected if full and open communication by the client is
encouraged than if it is inhibited. Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and
physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm. Substantial bodily harm includes life-threatening or
debilitating injuries and illnesses and the consequences of child sexual abuse. Such harm is
reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and
substantial threat that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take
action necessary to eliminate the threat.
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § I I 7A (Proposed Final Draft
No. 2 1998).
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symptoms provided by the attorney. As the court stated in SCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp.:
95
I see no reason to broaden the privilege beyond the narrow
standard as set forth in United Shoe. The purpose of the privilege is
to insure that the client may confide in his attorney to obtain legal
advice. Unless the legal advice reveals what the client has said, no
legitimate interest of the client is impaired by disclosing the
advice. Wigmore's discussion of the broader standard concedes
that it is not based on "any design of securing the attorney's
freedom of expression." 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2320, at 629. His
rationale is twofold: to prevent use of the attorney's statements as
admissions of the client or as revelations of the client's
communication. The latter reason, of course, is safeguarded by the
explicit requirement of the narrow standard. That same
requirement seems adequate to protect against admissions entitled
to protection. If the attorney's statement is based upon a fact
communicated by the client, its use as an admission is barred by
the availability of the privilege, even under the narrow standard. If
the attorney makes an admission as agent for his client, without
revealing a fact confidentially communicated from the client, no
reason appears why such admission should be protected. Thus,
Wigmore's reasons for adopting the broad standard are adequately
satisfied by the narrow standard.96
Second, where a prima facie case of fraudulent conduct can be
established, the information could be obtained under the crime or fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege. Third, the claim for damages
based on PTSD could be deemed a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, as is the case with medical records. By placing the plaintiffs
symptoms of PTSD in issue, fairness to the defendant would require
access to information the client received about PTSD prior to reporting
those symptoms.97 Such information is necessary to the defendant's
mental-health expert in evaluating the plaintiff's condition and as a basis
for evaluating the plaintiffs credibility at trial.
95. 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976).
96. Id. at 522.
97. Cf. e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66
VA. L. REV. 597, 635-42 (1980), quoted with approval in State v. Pawlyk, 115 Wash. 2d 457,
462-63, 800 P.2d 338, 341 (1990).
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Further, to the extent that plaintiffs will testify about their symptoms,
they arguably waive the confidentiality of information provided to them
prior to trial. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 612, the opposing party
may examine a document used "before testifying, if the court in its
discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice." The
authorities are split as to whether review by the witness of attorney-
prepared documents waives the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection."
In jurisdictions that grant the trial judge discretion to authorize
discovery of otherwise privileged materials provided to a witness,
materials concerning PTSD symptoms would present the strongest case
for permitting discovery. As noted above, it would be virtually
impossible for the defendant's mental-health evaluator to make an
accurate PTSD determination without access to materials provided to the
claimant.99 Similarly, the claimant's testimony at trial concerning the
symptoms would be inextricably intertwined with materials read
concerning PTSD symptoms prior to claiming to suffer such
symptoms. 0 In jurisdictions where the above bases for finding a waiver
of or exception to the attorney-client privilege would not be applicable,
however, a new exception for information about PTSD diagnosis and
symptoms should be established.
III. A NEW EXCEPTION TO ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Need for an Exception when Assessing PTSD Claims
When psychiatrists and psychologists evaluate a patient in a clinical
setting for PTSD symptoms, they generally rely on the patient's
statement of symptoms and their causes as the primary, if not sole,
source of data.'0 ' This is understandable and meets the standard of care
because it is assumed that the patient is motivated to report accurately in
98. See Alfred F. Belcour, Use It and Lose It-Privileged Documents, Preparing Witnesses, and
Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 171 (1984); see also James
Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 145-46 (D. Del. 1982) (finding that use of materials to
prepare witness waived privilege and work-product protections).
99. See supra notes 7-24 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
101. See Stewart A. Greenberg & Daniel W. Shuman, Irreconcilable Conflict Between
Therapeutic and Forensic Roles, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 50, 50-57 (1997); Larry H.
Strasburger, et al., On Wearing Two Hats: Role Conflict in Serving as Both Psychotherapist and
Expert Witness, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 448-56 (1997).
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order to obtain an appropriate diagnosis and treatment.'02 In forensic and
disability settings, additional motivational factors may influence what an
individual reports, and reliance on an individual's self-reporting of
symptoms is ill advised.' °3
It is in the context of these additional motivational factors that
concerns about a malingered PTSD diagnosis apply. Individuals can
malinger PTSD symptoms on their own, with the assistance of relevant
reading materials, or with the benefit of coaching by relatives, friends, or
counsel. In every case, it is necessary to evaluate these sources of
influence. After all, the goal of an independent exam is for the expert to
assess for the court the plaintiffs emotional status. To accomplish this
goal, the examiner must assess all factors that have contributed to the
client's presentation of symptoms, including the possibility of
extraneous factors that serve to educate the individual on symptoms not
truly present. In the forensic setting, all of these sources of influence can
be assessed by the expert except information provided by the attorney.
Thus, for example, in Nelsen v. Research Corp. of the University of
Hawaii,I°" a treating doctor provided information on psychiatric
symptoms of PTSD to the plaintiff Nelsen. The court stated: "I am not
persuaded that Nelsen in fact suffered the full range of PTSD symptoms,
based on the evidence indicating a lack of candor on the part of Nelsen,
and in light of the testimony at trial that Dr. Poletti provided Nelsen with
the DSM-Ill-R list of PTSD symptoms."0 5 In this context, an exception
102. See Greenberg & Shuman, supra note 10 1, at 53; Strasburger et al., supra note 10 i, at 450-
51.
103. See Greenburg & Shuman, supra note 101; Strasburger et al., supra note 10 1. The role of a
therapist is considered incompatible with the role of a forensic examiner because of the differing
approach to data demanded by each function. A similar concern underlies common law restrictions
on the statements-of-physical-condition exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.42, at 938-39 (2d ed. 1999):
The main reason to admit statements made for purposes of getting treatment is that they are
trustworthy. Usually they are made by the patient to his physician, and they describe past and
present physical sensations relating to his condition, so risks of misperception and faulty
memory are minimal. He knows his description helps determine treatment, so he has reason to
speak candidly and carefully, and risks of insincerity and ambiguity are minimal.
Statements for purposes of diagnosis offer no similar assurance of candor. The speaker is
likely to be trying either to prepare a doctor to testify or aid in litigation, or to get some other
personal benefit (job or insurance coverage). He is tempted to maximize or minimize, overstate
or understate injuries, pains, symptoms, and disabilities.
Id.; see also 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 277, at 233 (5th ed. 1999).
104. 805 F. Supp. 837 (D. Haw. 1992).
105. Id. at 844-45.
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to the attorney-client privilege is needed when mental-health profes-
sionals are asked to determine the validity of PTSD claims.
An unusual turn of events in one personal-injury case illustrates the
problem faced by experts attempting to assess claims of PTSD. In
Mallory v. Supreme Alaska Seafoods, Inc., 106 the plaintiff was asked at
deposition if he had read anything about PTSD, a condition that had
been diagnosed after plaintiffs attorney had referred his client to a
. 107
psychologist. Plaintiff's counsel objected to the question on the basis
of attorney-client privilege. The issue was taken before the judge, who
ruled that the nature of materials provided were privileged but the
materials were not. 10 8 The plaintiff then disclosed that his attorney had
provided deposition transcripts of other clients who, on referral by this
same attorney to the same psychologist, had all presented the classic
PTSD symptoms.
B. Policy Bases and Parameters for a New Exception
1. The Exception Should Be Narrowly Drawn To Avoid Detrimental
Effect on Attorney-Client Relationship
As discussed above, one of the primary rationales underlying
attorney-client confidentiality is the facilitation of frank and open client-
attorney communications." 9 The attorney-client privilege's aim is both
to facilitate the full development of facts necessary for effective
representation and to help a lawyer advise clients in the proper exercise
of their legal rights and the avoidance of any violation of the law. In the
long run, lawyers will be better able to assist clients to act properly if
they have all of the relevant information." '
None of the policy rationales in support of the privilege would be
frustrated by the adoption of a limited waiver of attorney-client
confidentiality in the situation of a plaintiff claiming PTSD as a source
of damages. The scope of the waiver would be extremely limited,
106. No. C95-322WD (W.D. Wash. July 7, 1995).
107. See id. at 2.
108. Id. Because written and oral information provided by any party other than counsel would
not be privileged, only coaching provided by attorneys is subject to privilege.
109. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
110. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 87-88, 98 (1990);
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4-5 (1975).
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including only those matters directly related to the nature, diagnosis, and
symptoms of PTSD. Because the waiver would take effect only when a
litigant placed those matters in issue, it would be consistent with the
patient-litigant exception to the physician-patient privilege. In the
context of a claim for damages resulting from PTSD, it makes little
sense to require disclosure of the plaintiffs communications with
psychological professionals while shielding communications from the
plaintiff's attorney that preceded the consultations with the mental-
health professionals and very likely influenced them.
In addition, the waiver could be limited to those statements and
materials about PTSD symptoms provided by the attorney to the client.
Some jurisdictions already limit the privilege to information
communicated by the client to the attorney, rather than the reverse."'
There is no evidence that such a limitation has negatively affected the
attorney-client relationship.
2. Information Is Essential to Accurate Diagnosis and Assessment of
Credibility
Once a plaintiff claims damages based on PTSD, the defendant has
the right to have the plaintiff evaluated by a mental-health professional.
Finding out whether a plaintiffs symptoms appeared spontaneously or
after he or she was provided with information about PTSD symptoms is
essential to an accurate evaluation. The importance of evaluating the
effect of information about PTSD symptoms is not diminished if the
information was provided by the attorney.
Consider how a mental-health professional would go about assessing
the possibility of attorney influence on a plaintiffs presentation of
symptoms. The issue could be approached by first asking a general
question such as: "Have there been any sources of information that have
influenced your knowledge of post-trauma reactions or your presentation
of symptoms today?" This type of question covers the possibility that
the plaintiff has acquired information from news articles, books, friends,
or other sources, including counsel. Only an affirmative response to the
general question would be followed by more focused ones such as,
"Have any of your friends who are war veterans spoken to you about
their post-trauma experiences?" In a similar vein the evaluator might
ask, "With specific reference to your attorney, has he or she advised you
11 I. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 520-23 (D. Conn. 1976).
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how you might present your problems today?," or "Has counsel ever
advised you or provided information concerning how people react to
traumatic events?" Both the general question and more specific
questions open the door for a plaintiff to discuss what may be considered
privileged communications, though only in a very limited area of
concern-and only if the attorney has in fact provided information about
PTSD symptoms.
The arguments noted above for applying the "at issue" exception to
attomey-client confidentiality would also justify a new exception." 2
Because the proposed waiver or exception would only take effect when a
litigant places those matters in issue, it would be in line with the matter-
in-issue exception. By asserting PTSD as a source of damages, the
plaintiff would be deemed to have placed any oral or written statements
by the attorney regarding the nature, diagnosis, and symptoms of PTSD
in issue and thus should be considered to have waived the privilege
regarding those particular communications.
Just as a personal-injury plaintiff who waives his or her physician-
plaintiff privilege on bringing the action is not thereby precluded from
seeking medical assistance, so too the proposed waiver should not
prevent a client from seeking a lawyer's advice. Lawyers may ethically
provide information concerning the symptoms of PTSD to clients prior
to their psychological evaluation." 3 But if they do provide such
information, the evaluator must have access to the information to make
an accurate evaluation. At the very least, the evaluator should be
permitted to ask about prompting or bases for the symptoms other than
spontaneous occurrence, and then be permitted to indicate, as part of the
basis for the evaluation, if the plaintiff had refused to answer. This
background information would also be vital for the jury to make an
accurate assessment of the credibility of the plaintiffs condition and the
expert's evaluation thereof.
3. A Limited Exception Is Necessary in Fairness to Defendants
While attomey-client confidentiality serves many laudable goals,
there are strong countervailing policies favoring disclosure when
litigants assert PTSD as a source of damages and there is a possibility of
attorney coaching concerning the symptoms. For one, assertion of the
112. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
113. See infra Part III.B.4.
Vol. 76:313, 2001
Confidentiality and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
privilege in this instance blocks the defendant's access to materials that
are crucial to the claim asserted against the defendant. Courts in similar
situations have weighed the equities and come out on the side of a
waiver." 4 Starting its analysis with a "presumption in favor of
preserving the privilege," one court found that
In a civil damages action, however, fairness requires that the
privilege holder surrender the privilege to the extent that it will
weaken, in a meaningful way, the defendant's ability to defend.
That is, the privilege ends at the point where the defendant can
show that the plaintiff's civil claim, and the probable defenses
thereto, are enmeshed in important evidence that will be
unavailable to the defendant if the privilege prevails. The burden
on the defendant is proportional to the importance of the privilege.
The court should develop the parameters of its discovery order by
carefully weighing the interests involved, balancing the importance
of the privilege asserted against the defending party's need for the
information to construct its most effective defense." 5
Following this reasoning, a PTSD plaintiffs claim may be
"enmeshed" in the content of the attorney-client communications.
Accurate diagnosis of PTSD is dependent on the client's truthful
reporting of certain key symptoms and the psychotherapist's knowledge
of whether the client was provided prior information about those
symptoms. Therefore, it is impossible for defendants to construct a
defense against coached manifestations of PTSD if they are prevented
from gaining access to the very communications that contain the
relevant evidence. Where the evidence is crucial to the defendant's
ability to defend against a claim and the disclosure is narrowly limited to
information about PTSD symptoms provided to a plaintiff asserting
PTSD as a basis for a damages award, the balance of equities in such a
personal-injury action should tip toward disclosure.
114. See, e.g., Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 838 F.2d 13,
20 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding, in case involving prosecution for criminal trespass, that only privileged
communications which were made while undercover informant was present were subject to
discovery); State v. Pawlyk, 115 Wash. 2d 457,463-65,800 P.2d 338, 341-42 (1990).
115. Newburyport, 838 F.2d at 20.
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4. An Exception Will Assist in Discouragement and Discovery of
Fraud
In addition to fairness to defendants, an exception to the privilege
would serve to discourage fraudulent claims of PTSD. If plaintiffs (and
their lawyers) are aware that placing their condition in issue by asserting
the claim will make information they have seen or heard regarding the
symptoms of PTSD nonprivileged, they may be less likely to fabricate
the elements of the claim and attorneys may be less likely to prompt
clients with information they know can be revealed to the evaluator.
As the exceptions suggest, the privilege does not have a firm
constitutional basis as it is applied in civil litigation. The Sixth
Amendment provides some protection from disclosure in criminal
cases.'16 But in civil cases, the policy favoring liberal discovery 7-- a
relatively recent development compared to the attorney-client
privilege-weighs heavily in favor of limiting the privilege.
In an adversary system, the attorney is often placed in an extremely
difficult position. On the one hand, the attorney has an obligation to give
clients the benefit of the attorney's knowledge and expertise. In the
context of a client involved in a traumatic event, the client is likely to
inquire about the likelihood and nature of potential damages. The
attorney would be remiss in failing to advise that, in addition to damages
for physical injury, lost wages, and harm to personal property damages
may be awarded for emotional and psychological trauma.
116. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Sixth
Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications between the accused and his
attorney."); Mosteller, supra note 1, at 270 & n.202.
117. See, e.g., Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299,
342, 858 P.2d 1054, 1077 (1993). The Fisons court stated:
The concept that a spirit of cooperation and forthrightness during the discovery process is
necessary for the proper functioning of modem trials is reflected in decisions of our Court of
Appeals. In Gammon v. Clark Equip. Co., 38 Wash. App. 274, 686 P.2d 1102 (1984), qfJ'd,
104 Wash. 2d 613, 707 P.2d 685 (1985), the Court of Appeals held that a new trial should
have been ordered because of discovery abuse by the defendant. Then Court of Appeals Judge
Barbara Durham wrote for the court:
The Supreme Court has noted that the aim of the liberal federal discovery rules is to "make
a trial less a game of blindman's b[l]uff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." The availability of liberal discovery means
that civil trials no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear... for the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.
Id.
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Suppose, for example, that the client was injured in a plane crash. In
the ensuing lawsuit against the airline, the client would seek damages,
including damages for psychological and emotional trauma. Lawyers
may properly provide information about the diagnosis and symptoms of
PTSD so that clients might determine whether they have experienced
such symptoms. A plane-crash victim who has had nightmares or is
afraid to take airplane trips may not realize such effects can form the
basis for a PTSD diagnosis or resulting damages. Discussion with the
client's attorney about potential symptoms may be necessary to protect
the client's rights. For example, the attorney might ask specific
questions about unusual fears, dreams, relationship problems, inability
to engage in certain activities, and other difficulties that can occur post-
trauma.
While such questions may be permissible, an attorney actually telling
a client to study a list of symptoms, a book on PTSD, or sample
depositions of clients who successfully obtained a PTSD diagnosis
would appear to constitute impermissible coaching. There is a fine line
between necessary and desirable preparation and unethical coaching;
between helping the client understand and express existing trauma
reactions and assisting the client to create symptoms that did not
previously exist."8 To the extent that lawyers assist in the creation of
symptoms that did not otherwise exist, they violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 19
In addition to providing the forensic evaluator information essential
to an accurate diagnosis, disclosure of information provided by the
attorney would serve as a disincentive to "create" symptoms that did not
otherwise exist. At the least, a client who described symptoms in the
precise language of a list, book, or deposition transcript provided by the
118. As Professor Wolfram stated:
The line between legitimate and disreputable preparation is largely one of the lawyer's
intentions. A lawyer may legitimately attempt to refresh a witness' memory, to assist the
witness to testify in a straightforward and effective way, and to help the witness be prepared to
meet improper or suggestive lines of hostile examination. On the other hand, a lawyer may not
assist or school a witness in twisting or distorting the witness' subjective memory and, thus,
the truth as far as the witness knows it.
WOLFRAM, supra note 26, § 12.43, at 648 (footnotes omitted) (commenting that witness must also
"testify in his or her own words" and not "simply to parrot words and phrases supplied by a
lawyer").
119. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (assisting client in conduct that is
fraudulent); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (fraud upon court); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel).
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attomey would lose credibility and the likelihood of a diagnosis of
PTSD. And, in extreme cases, fraudulent conduct would be exposed.
21
Permitting a limited exception for information about PTSD symptoms
provided to the client is one way of discouraging unethical coaching and
determining those instances in which the lawyer has gone beyond proper
counseling to assist a client in committing fraud. Allowing the fact-
finder access to the communications should make clear the nature of the
attorney's conduct. That is, it should be apparent from the content of the
communications whether the claim of PTSD was manufactured or was
in fact mainly elicited from the client who was already experiencing the
symptoms without knowing what they were.
Even if evidence of the information is not permitted at trial, it is still
desirable to require disclosure during discovery. Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 703, it is well established that an expert (here, a diagnosing
psychiatrist or psychologist) can base his or her testimony on evidence
that would not be admissible at trial. In the court's discretion, such bases
of expert testimony are discoverable. 2' In such a case the court ought to
120. An example of how the attorney-client privilege in the civil context obscured the truth for
too long can be found in the tobacco litigation. For nearly forty years, the tobacco companies
succeeded in hiding a massive fraud on the American public by invoking the attorney-client
privilege. When the veil of deception was finally pierced, it was revealed that counsel for the
tobacco companies participated in the creation of an elaborate public-relations scheme to
encourage the public to continue smoking cigarettes by pretending to investigate the health hazards
of smoking. In reality, the tobacco companies were already in possession of information that
smoking was hazardous to the health, which they deviously suppressed by even going so far as to
prohibit scientists on their payroll from publishing study results. See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 167 F.R.D. 134, 142-43 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding evidence sufficient to establish
prima facie showing that tobacco-company attorneys were used to facilitate perpetration of
continuing fraud to deceive American public about hazards of smoking); Haines v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 697 (D.N.J.), order vacated on other grounds, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992)
(finding that intentional shielding of evidence that scientific research might tend to prove smoking
caused disease was viable theory of fraud entitling plaintiffs to discovery of withheld documents
under crime or fraud exception to attorney-client privilege).
121. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause,
the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Id.
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"develop the parameters of its discovery order by carefully weighing the
interests involved, balancing the importance of the privilege asserted
against the defending party's need for the information to construct its
most effective defense."'
As noted above, it is essential in some cases for the defendant's
forensic mental-health expert to know whether the claimant received
information about PTSD symptoms in order to make an accurate
diagnosis. Because the exception would be limited to information
provided by the attorney-and not communications the client made in
confidence-there would be a very limited impact on the attorney-client
relationship.
C. An Exception May Be Found or Established by the Courts or
Enacted by the Legislature: Washington, a Case Study
Evidentiary privileges in Washington are established by the
legislature and the courts. do not have discretion to establish new
privileges."z Exceptions to existing privileges, on the other hand, may
be created either by the legislature 24 or by the courts.'25 In fact, the
122. Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 838 F.2d 13, 20 (1st
Cir. 1988). See also United Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 483 A.2d 821 (N.J. 1984), where the court
held that within the framework of the pretrial discovery process, the attorney-client shield may be
pierced when confidential communications are made a material issue by virtue of the allegations in
the pleadings and where such information cannot be secured from any less intrusive source. The
court stated:
Assuming that all or some of the documents fall within the purview of the attorney-client
privilege, it must then be determined whether overriding public policy concerns nevertheless
compel disclosure. The "necessary foundations to the valid piercing of [the] privilege" were
described by our Supreme Court in In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232,398 A.2d 882 (1979). There, the
Court adopted a tripartite test in determining whether the privilege must yield to other
important societal concerns. First, "[t]here must be a legitimate need... to reach the evidence
sought to be shielded." Id. at 243, 398 A.2d 882. Second, "[t]here must be a showing of
relevance and materiality of that evidence to the issue before the court." Id. at 243-244, 398
A.2d 882. Lastly, the party seeking to bar assertion of the privilege must show "by a fair
preponderance of the evidence including all reasonable inferences that the information
[cannot] be secured from any less intrusive source." Id. at 244, 398 A.2d 882.
Wolosoff, 483 A.2d at 826 (alterations in original).
123. See, e.g., Drewett v. Rainer Sch., 60 Wash. App. 728, 731,806 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1991).
124. See, e.g., VASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (2000) (establishing physician-patient privilege,
"except as follows: (a) In any judicial proceedings regarding a child's injury, neglect, or sexual
abuse or the cause thereof; and (b) Ninety days after filing an action for personal injuries or
wrongful death, the claimant shall be deemed to waive the physician-patient privilege")
125. See, e.g., State v. Modest, 88 Wash. App. 239, 247-48, 944 P.2d 417, 421 (1997)
(recognizing guardianship exception to marital privilege).
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Washington Supreme Court recently stated that "[i]egislative grants of
testimonial privilege conflict with the inherent power of the courts to
compel the production of relevant evidence and are, therefore, strictly
construed."'' 1 6 The Washington appellate courts have established a
number of exceptions to the attorney-client privilege when they found
the public interest outweighed the benefits the privilege was intended to
promote. 1
27
The Washington Supreme Court, in determining whether to create an
exception to the attorney-client privilege, stated:
The court is faced with the task of balancing society's interest in
the free and open flow of communication between attorney and
client, which the privilege promotes, against society's interest in
the administration of justice by our courts on the basis of a full
disclosure of the facts and with the affirmative assistance of
attorneys, which the privilege discourages. 128
Similarly, in Pappas v. Holloway,1 9 the court held that the attorney-
client privilege does not prevent disclosure of confidential commun-
ications between the client and the third-party-defendant attorney in a
malpractice action where the information sought was relevant to the
malpractice issue raised by the client and where the application of the
126. C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 2d 699, 717, 985 P.2d 262,
271 (1999) (refusing, with respect to reports from priest's mental-health counselors sent to Diocese,
to "fashion a rule similar to the 'joint defense' or 'common interest' rule under which
communications exchanged between multiple parties engaged in a common defense remain
privileged under the attorney-client privilege").
127. See, e.g., Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 11,448 P.2d 490, 496 (1968). Dike established the
exception that an attorney may be compelled, under certain circumstances, to disclose the
whereabouts of his client: "The exceptions which have arisen are the result of a balancing process
in which the courts have had to weigh the benefits of the privilege against the public interest in the
criminal investigation process .... " Id. (quoting Formal Opinion 91 (1933), ABA, Opinions on
Prof. Ethics 339 (1967)); see also State v. Pawlyk, 115 Wash. 2d 457, 800 P.2d 338 (1990) (finding
that attorney-client privilege does not prevent disclosure of confidential communications between
client and psychiatrist retained by defense counsel to evaluate defendant for purposes of insanity
defense, even if defendant never calls psychiatrist as witness at trial); State v. Chervenell, 99 Wash.
2d 309, 316, 662 P.2d 836, 840 (1983) (finding that attorney-client privilege does not prevent
criminal defendant's former attorney from testifying to advice given regarding defendant's waiver
of his constitutional rights); State v. Sheppard, 52 Wash. App. 707, 763 P.2d 1232 (1998) (noting
that fee arrangements between attomey and client not protected from disclosure by attorney-client
privilege, unless disclosure would convey substance of confidential attorney-client
communication); Whetstone v. Olson, 46 Wash. App. 308, 732 P.2d 159 (1986) (furtherance of
crime or fraud); State v. Metcalf, 14 Wash. App. 232, 540 P.2d 459 (1975) (same).
128. See Dike, 75 Wash. 2d at 14, 448 P.2d at 498.
129. 114 Wash. 2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990).
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privilege would deny the attorney an adequate defense. 30 The court
applied the Hearn v. Rhay3 three-part test to determine whether an
applied waiver of the attorney-client privilege should be found.' The
court noted a Louisiana court's criticism of the Hearn test on the basis
that it "'improperly undermines the legislatively established attorney-
client privilege by causing courts to reassess the privilege by weighing
the individual privilege-holder's interests against his opponent's need
for evidence whenever the privilege is attacked." 3 3 The Washington
Supreme Court responded to the criticism of Hearn by noting that:
While it is true that the attorney-client privilege is statutory in
nature, it is also true that this court has held that the privilege itself
should be strictly limited for the purpose for which it exists. [citing
Dike]. In this instance, the Holloways cannot counterclaim against
Pappas for malpractice and at the same time conceal from him
communications which have a direct bearing on this issue simply
because the attorney-client privilege protects them. To do so would
in effect enable them to use as a sword the protection which the
Legislature awarded them as a shield.134
In State v. Bonds, 35 the court appointed a psychiatrist to assist
defense counsel and to evaluate the defendant for purposes of an insanity
plea.'36 When the defense decided not to call the psychiatrist as a witness
at the trial, the prosecution sought the psychiatrist's testimony.'37 The
defendant claimed that the psychiatrist's testimony was protected under
the attorney-client privilege because the doctor had been part of the
defense team at the juvenile proceedings. 3 1 The court rejected this
contention on the basis that the public interest in full disclosure
outweighed the privilege. As noted in State v. Pawlyk,39 the Bonds court
130. See id. at 203-04, 787 P.2dat34.
131. 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975). For a discussion of the Hearn test, see supra notes 68-
80 and accompanying text.
132. Pappas, 114 Wash. 2d at 207, 787 P.2d at 36.
133. Id. at 208, 787 P.2d at 36 (quoting Succession of Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley,
513 So. 2d 1138, 1145 (La. 1987)).
134. Id.
135. 98 Wash. 2d 1,653 P.2d 1024 (1982).
136. Id. at 18, 653 P.2d at 1034.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 115 Wash. 2d 457, 800 P.2d 338 (1990).
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found persuasive the reasoning in Saltzburg, Privileges and
Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 Va. L. Rev. 597, 635-
42 (1980), where the author "argues that the defense psychiatrist's
examination of the defendant is likely to be more accurate on the
issue of insanity than that of the prosecution's.... Moreover, a
defendant might benefit by undergoing several psychiatric
examinations, examining reports of psychiatrists unfavorable to his
insanity defense, and tailoring his responses in subsequent
examinations more favorably to his defense ..... Saltzburg argues,
and we agree, that for these reasons all available evidence of
defendant's mental condition should be put before the jury. 4 °
These bases are also applicable to materials about PTSD symptoms
provided to a claimant prior to evaluation by a defense mental-health
professional. That evaluation is likely to be more accurate if the
evaluator has access to potential bases for the claimant's responses, and
the claimant might well use the information about symptoms to tailor his
responses to the evaluator's questions more favorably to support the
PTSD claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Increasingly, plaintiffs have claimed emotional and psychological
damages on the basis of their having developed PTSD. Essential to an
accurate assessment of PTSD claims is the evaluator's ability to
determine all sources of information about related symptoms that may
have been available to the plaintiff and that may impact that individual's
clinical presentation. At present, however, the plaintiff's assertion of
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection is likely to prevent
discovery of information provided by the plaintiffs attorney.
Lawyers and courts determine the "rules of the game," and they can
modify them when supported by convincing policy rationales. Thus, for
example, the civil discovery rules have been amended on a number of
occasions in an attempt to establish the proper balance between
competing considerations, including attorney work product and client
privilege, encouraging the parties to zealously pursue all possible factual
and legal bases for their positions, avoiding fraudulent claims while
encouraging efforts to seek changes in the law, and, most important,
deciding cases accurately based on all relevant facts.
140. Id. at 462-63, 800 P.2d at 341 (quoting Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d at 21,653 P.2d at 1035).
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Consideration of similar policy rationales warrants discovery and
admission of information about PTSD symptoms provided by attorneys
whose clients claim damages on the basis of PTSD. Existing authority,
on the basis of waiver or an exception to the privilege, supports allowing
access to such information. However, to the extent that existing
authority within a particular jurisdiction is deemed not to support such a
waiver or exception, a new exception is justified: the very minor (if any)
impact on the attorney-client relationship of a limited exception for
materials provided by the attorney regarding PTSD diagnosis and
symptoms is substantially outweighed by the need of the mental-health
evaluator to have access to that information. As the Washington
Supreme Court stated with respect to a criminal defendant's asserted
right to prevent access to communications with a psychiatrist retained by
defense counsel to evaluate the defendant for purposes of an insanity
defense:
defendant's asserted right.., reflects the "bygone philosophy that
for an attorney's investigations to be effective they must be
shrouded in secrecy." If defendant asserts an insanity defense,
evidence pertaining to that defense must be available to both sides
at trial. There is thus no need for the confidentiality defendant
maintains is required.'4 '
Limited access to information provided to a PTSD claimant by his or her
attorney is essential to a fair and accurate mental-health evaluation. In
addition, knowledge that such information will be discoverable will
discourage improper coaching by overzealous counsel.
141. Pawlyk, 115 Wash. 2d at 470, 800 P.2d at 345 (quoting State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668,
677 (Iowa 1984)).
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